Supply chain attacks move up the risk register
Software supply chain security has been a talking point for years, but for many organizations it remained just that, a topic for conference panels and compliance checklists. The latest wave of incidents is changing that. Coordinated attacks that compromise widely used open source libraries and CI infrastructure have shown how quickly malicious code can propagate through modern development ecosystems.
Unlike traditional breaches that target a specific company, supply chain attacks exploit shared dependencies. A compromised package on a public registry can end up in thousands of applications, from internal tools to customer facing products, long before anyone notices. The impact can range from data exfiltration to remote code execution in sensitive environments.
How attackers are abusing the open source ecosystem
The techniques behind recent incidents are diverse, but they share a few patterns. One common vector is account takeover. If an attacker gains access to a maintainer’s credentials on a package registry or source hosting service, they can publish a new version of a popular library that contains hidden backdoors or data stealing code.
Another tactic is typosquatting, publishing malicious packages with names that closely resemble legitimate ones. In large codebases and scripts, a single character’s difference can go unnoticed, especially when automated tools manage dependencies.
More sophisticated campaigns target the build infrastructure itself. By compromising CI runners or exploiting misconfigurations in build scripts, attackers can inject malicious payloads into artifacts that appear to come from trusted source code. In these cases, simply reviewing the repository is not enough, the final binaries may differ from the visible source.
SBOMs are useful, but only as part of a system
In response to these threats, governments and regulators are promoting Software Bills of Materials. An SBOM is essentially an ingredients list for software. It enumerates the components and versions used to build an application, including open source libraries and transitive dependencies.
SBOMs are valuable for incident response and ongoing risk management. When a vulnerability or malicious package is disclosed, organizations with accurate SBOMs can quickly identify affected systems. They also enable more informed risk assessments during procurement, as buyers can ask vendors to disclose their software compositions.
However, SBOMs are not a silver bullet. They do not, by themselves, guarantee that components are trustworthy or that the build process is secure. For SBOMs to matter, they must be kept up to date, integrated into CI pipelines, and linked with vulnerability intelligence and policy engines that can trigger alerts or block deployments.
Code signing and provenance are gaining traction
To address the gap between source code and final artifacts, the industry is moving toward stronger signing and provenance standards. The goal is to give consumers of software a way to verify who built a piece of code and how it was built.
Modern frameworks encourage signing at multiple stages. Source commits can be signed by developers, build systems can sign produced binaries, and container images can carry signatures that attest to their origin. Consumers can then configure policy engines to accept only artifacts that meet predefined criteria, such as coming from specific build pipelines or being signed with approved keys.
Projects like Sigstore and frameworks like SLSA are part of this movement. They provide open source tooling and reference models for creating, storing, and verifying attestations. Cloud providers and dev tooling vendors are increasingly integrating these capabilities into their platforms to lower the barrier to adoption.
Balancing security controls with developer velocity
The obvious concern for many teams is that stricter supply chain controls will slow down development. That risk is real, but it is not inevitable. The key is to design controls that integrate naturally into existing workflows rather than layering manual gates on top.
Automated policy checks during pull requests and CI runs can flag problematic dependencies or missing signatures before code merges. Pre approved component catalogs give developers a curated set of libraries to choose from, reducing the odds of accidental typosquatting. Centralized dependency scanning services can monitor repositories and registries across the organization, rather than forcing each team to maintain its own scanners.
Communication matters too. Developers are more likely to embrace supply chain controls when they understand the rationale and when security teams are transparent about trade offs. Providing clear, actionable remediation guidance when a policy blocks a build goes a long way toward maintaining trust.
Practical steps for development leaders
For engineering managers and platform teams, the path forward can be broken into phased milestones. The first phase focuses on visibility. Inventory your critical applications and generate SBOMs where possible. If existing tooling is not available, prioritize key systems, such as customer facing services and internal identity infrastructure.
In parallel, standardize dependency management. Encourage or mandate the use of package lock files and internal mirrors or proxies for public registries. This reduces the risk of silently pulling in new, potentially compromised versions of dependencies without review.
The second phase introduces verification. Begin signing build artifacts from centralized CI systems and enforcing basic verification for deployments. Pilot provenance frameworks on a limited set of services before expanding coverage. Integrate alerts from vulnerability databases with SBOMs so that security and platform teams receive early warnings.
The final phase, which will take time, is cultural. Make supply chain security a shared responsibility, not a separate track owned solely by security teams. Include it in engineering design reviews, post incident analyses, and onboarding for new developers. Over time, secure defaults can become the path of least resistance.
What CISOs should watch in the regulatory landscape
Supply chain incidents are prompting stronger regulatory scrutiny. Governments are considering or implementing requirements that critical software suppliers provide SBOMs, follow minimum secure development standards, and report breaches within specific timelines.
CISOs should monitor these developments closely. Even if your organization is not directly regulated, your customers might be, and they will pass expectations downstream. Building robust supply chain security capabilities now will reduce the scramble later.
It is also worth engaging with industry groups and standards bodies. Input from practitioners can help shape regulations and frameworks that are both effective and realistic for modern development practices.
Securing the foundation without freezing innovation
Modern software is built on layers of shared components and automated tooling. That reality brings enormous benefits in speed and capability, but it also creates a broad attack surface. The latest supply chain attacks are a reminder that trust models must evolve alongside our tooling.
By combining accurate SBOMs, strong signing and provenance, and thoughtfully integrated policies, organizations can significantly raise the bar for attackers. The process will take time and will require coordination between development, security, and operations teams.
The alternative, ignoring supply chain risk until a major incident forces a rushed response, is far more costly. The organizations that navigate this transition best will be those that treat supply chain security as an essential part of engineering excellence, not as a bolt on afterthought.
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